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MS H O R T A R T I C L EType II Audience Costs
Kai Quek, University of Hong KongTraditional audience costs are the political losses a leader incurs for backing down after threatening to ﬁght (type I).
Type II audience costs are the losses incurred for entering a conﬂict after promising not to ﬁght. I develop the idea and
decompose it experimentally into its constituents: an inconsistency cost plus the loss of a nonbelligerence dividend. Type II
audience costs have deep implications, including the reversal of certainmicrofoundational challenges against type I audience
costs in the context of type II audience costs, the credible signaling of a state’s resolve not to ﬁght, and a reassurance
mechanism with attractive properties.uch attention in international relations is paid to
the problem of how leaders can credibly threaten
to use force. Less attention is paid to how they can
credibly promise not to use force. The problem of credible
threat may be solved when leaders generate what I will call
type I audience costs: the political costs of backing down
after threatening to ﬁght (Fearon 1994).1 The problem of
credible reassurance may have a similar solution through
what I will call type II audience costs: the political costs of
entering a conﬂict after promising not to ﬁght.2
Despite a great deal of attention on type I audience costs
type II audience costs remain unexplored, except in Levy
et al. (2015).3 I develop the concept and show how type II
audience costs change the way we think about audience cost
theory and the credible signaling of a state’s resolve not to
ﬁght. Then, I decompose the concept into its constituents—
the cost of inconsistency and the loss of a nonbelligerence
dividend—and highlight how these losses tighten the tying-
hands constraints on leaders to enhance reassurance credi-
bility. Finally, I comparemy results with Levy et al. (2015) andKai Quek (quek@hku.hk) is an assistant professor of politics at the University o
Data and supporting materials necessary to reproduce the numerical results in
/dataverse/jop). An online appendix with supplementary material is available at
Committee on the Use of Humans as Experimental Subjects at the Massachusetts I
funded the primary experiment in this project.
1. Since Fearon (1994), the literature has conceptualized “audience costs” as t
cost theory have followed the same understanding (e.g., Snyder and Borghard 2
2. I follow the practice of naming orthogonal types as types I and II, e.g., ty
3. Levy et al. (2015) focus on the consistency mechanism in audience cost the
decompose the concept into its constituent elements. The experiments here, ﬁeld
2014.
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dependent experiments cross on a common topic.
TYPE II AUDIENCE COSTS
Type II audience costs are promise based rather than threat
based; they focus on reassurance rather than deterrence;
and while both type I and type II audience costs try to shape
beliefs, the beliefs they try to shape are orthogonal: type I is
about convincing others of one’s willingness to bear the costs
of war; type II is about convincing others of the converse.
These differences have microfoundational implications. In
particular, a long-standing issue in audience cost theory is
how the consistency mechanism can bear the weight of war
(e.g., Slantchev 2006; Snyder and Borghard 2011; Trachten-
berg 2012). Why would citizens punish their leader for avoid-
ing a costly war? Can we assume audience costs to be high
enough to override the costs of war? Slantchev (2011, 51)
argued that “when one talks about things as vague and as
amorphous as ‘national honor’ and compares them to the
blood, the destruction of lives and property, and the psycho-f Hong Kong.
the article are available in the JOP Dataverse (https://dataverse.harvard.edu
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/693348. The experiments were approved by the
nstitute of Technology. The MIT Political Experiments Research Laboratory
he costs of backing down from a threat. Developers and critics of audience
011, 437; Tomz 2007, 821; Weeks 2008, 35).
pe I and type II errors.
ory and do not analyze type II audience costs as a distinct phenomenon or
ed in 2012 and 2013, were independent from Levy et al.’s study ﬁelded in
7. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/693348
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Volume 79 Number 4 October 2017 / 1439logical scars a war invariably inﬂicts on its participants, this
assumption becomes heroic indeed.”
This logical liability vanishes in the context of type II
audience costs. Type II audience costs assume that the public
punishes politicians for a reversal that brings about a costly
war—a premise easier to accept than with type I audience
costs when the public punishes politicians for a reversal that
avoids a costly war. And while the logic of type I audience
costs traditionally assumes that leaders are able and willing to
create audience costs so large such that war is preferable to
peace for at least some types (see Fearon 1997, 80; Slantchev
2011, 51),4 the assumption is unnecessary for type II audience
costs. In addition, type II audience costs can shed light on
a major debate in audience cost theory: the existence in do-
mestic audiences of a preference for consistency (Fearon 1994;
Smith 1998). This is challenged by Snyder and Borghard
(2011), who argued that the public cares about policy sub-
stance rather than policy consistency. Testing for both type I
and type II audience costs in the same experiment can inform
this debate. Because respondents are randomly assigned to
treatments, and because the two types of audience costs in-
volve mirror forms of policy inconsistency triggered by two
opposite policy actions (intervention vs. nonintervention), an
intrinsic public desire for consistency is revealed if leaders
are punished for their inconsistency regardless of the policy
they choose.
Theoretically, type II audience costs offer a mechanism for
signaling the resolve to stay out. Much of the extant literature
focuses on signaling one’s resolve to ﬁght. Less attention is
paid to signaling one’s resolve not to ﬁght.5 But there are key
instances in which a state needs to signal its resolve not to
intervene. One example is a bargaining situation whereby one
state offers to stay out of another state’s interests in exchange
for an irreversible concession.6 A problem of credible com-4. Tarar and Leventoglu (2013) proposed a model in which lesser
audience costs can have conﬂict-reduction effects.
5. There are few works that explicitly analyze how to signal one’s
resolve not to enter a war in the ﬁrst place. The closest literature might be
that on war termination, in which belligerents need to persuade each other
that they are willing to stop ﬁghting and commit to a peaceful bargain.
6. Another example is a situation when a state has an incentive to stay
out of a crisis beyond its borders—insofar as the crisis can be contained by
local forces or neighboring states involved in the crisis. But the more the
crisis implicates the interests of the distant state, the harder it is to con-
vince others to bear the full costs of containing the crisis on their own. Yet
another situation is in times of crisis when states have an incentive to be
neutral in the present (e.g., on the eve of war) but also an incentive to
opportunistically intervene in the future (e.g., at the close of war). Cursed
by the commitment problem, it can be crucial for neutral states to send
signals of neutrality to prevent preemptive attacks, by tying their hands as
a means of communicating their resolve to stay out.
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All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms mitment is created because the nonintervention promise can
be broken in the future, but the concession—once given—is
gone. To make the offer credible, a state can generate type II
audience costs by publicizing the promise of nonintervention.
An example of historical signiﬁcance is the US public non-
invasion pledge in the Cuban Missile Crisis. It is interesting
that the crisis started with type I audience costs—“Kennedy’s
televised speech announcing the presence of Soviet missiles
in Cuba” (Fearon 1994, 582)—but ended with an appeal to
type II audience costs.7 In exchange for removing nuclear
weapons from Cuba, the Soviet government demanded the
United States pledge publicly not to invade Cuba (New York
Times, October 28, 1962). Many historians now agree that
the public pledge not to invade Cuba—rather than the secret
promise to remove missiles in Turkey—was a key compo-
nent of the agreement that ended the crisis and prevented a
nuclear war.
TYPE II AUDIENCE COSTS DECOMPOSED
Public threats and promises about war and peace will affect
public approval if the population is sensitive to the costs and
risks of war. If leaders pay a “belligerence cost” (Kertzer and
Brutger 2016) for threatening to enter a conﬂict, then they
should also earn a “nonbelligerence dividend” for promising
to stay out.8 The former is a political loss, but the latter is a
political gain. Speciﬁcally, the belligerence cost is an irre-
coverable sunk cost (Kertzer and Brutger 2016), but the non-
belligerence dividend is a retractable gain—a “tying-hands
gain” that is lost if the promise is broken. The idea of costly
signaling through “tying-hands cost” (Fearon 1997) is well
known. But the idea of costly signaling through the loss of the
tying-hands gain is not. A conjecture is that the loss of tying-
hands gain is at least as salient as tying-hands cost, given an
endowment effect whereby leaders assign greater prospective
disutility to losing what they already possess (Kahneman and
Tversky 1979).
Type II audience costs comprise an inconsistency cost and
a loss of nonbelligerence dividend. When a leader breaks a
promise to stay out, he or she loses twice—suffering the cost
for being inconsistent and losing the dividend for nonbel-
ligerence. The dual losses tighten the tying-hands constraints
on leaders to strengthen reassurance credibility. Insofar as the
inconsistency cost and the loss of nonbelligerence dividend7. As highlighted in a recent review, “Contrary to long-held belief, JFK’s
secret Turkish concession did not inﬂuence Khrushchev’s move” (Hershberg
2010, 83).
8. Indeed, leaders in modern history have often shown a public desire
to appear as the nonbelligerent in a conﬂict—a behavior that might reﬂect
a belief that nonbelligerence will be rewarded by domestic and interna-
tional audiences.
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constitute a pure tying-hands signal.9
EXPERIMENTS
I ﬁelded two experiments. In May 2012, the primary experi-
ment was implemented on a national sample recruited by
Survey Sampling International (SSI) to match the adult US
census population on age, gender, income, and geography
(np 696).10 In June 2013, a replication experiment was
implemented with subjects recruited through Amazon.com’s
Mechanical Turk (AMT; np 778). Respondents were linked
from SSI or AMT to an Internet survey. They began the ex-
periments by reading about a foreign crisis similar to that in
Tomz (2007), which is the standard model for audience cost
experiments. A neutral vignette is used to achieve compara-
bility with Kertzer and Brutger (2016), Levy et al. (2015), and
Tomz (2007)—all of which used a similar vignette involving
an anonymous president without injecting speciﬁc domestic
cues or frames. Respondents in the primary experiment were
randomly assigned to one of four conditions, all of which had
a similar crisis scenario in which a foreign country sent its
military to take over a neighboring country. The experi-
mental conditions differed only in the way the US president
dealt with the crisis.
The control condition and treatment 1 reconstructed
Tomz’s (2007) test for type I audience costs. In the control
condition (“stay-out”), the president said that the United
States would stay out of the conﬂict, and the United States
did stay out eventually. In treatment 1 (“reneged-threat”),
the president threatened military intervention but even-
tually backed down. This allows us to isolate the effect of9. Kertzer and Brutger (2016, 236–38) argued that since type I audience
costs comprise an inconsistency cost and a belligerence cost, and since the latter
is a sunk cost “invoking an alternative signaling mechanism,” type I audience
costs are “double-barreled” and do not constitute a pure tying-hands signal.
10. SSI samples have been used in many studies in political science,
including Kertzer and Brutger (2016).
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the same outcome (staying out). Type I audience costs are
measured by comparing public approval between the two
conditions. Treatments 2 and 3 rescripted the crisis outcome
to capture type II audience costs. Two critical twists were
introduced: while the president stayed out of the conﬂict in
treatment 1, the president in treatments 2 and 3 did not. In
treatment 2, the president said that the United States would
intervene and it did. In treatment 3, the president said that
the United States would not intervene but it did. These con-
ditions allow us to isolate the effect of the president’s reversal,
while holding constant the same outcome (intervention).11
Type II audience costs are measured by comparing public
approval between the two treatments. Appendix 1 (apps. 1
and 2 available online) shows the full experimental text. Ap-
pendix 2 (table S1; tables S1–S6 available online) shows the SSI
sample is comparable on key demographic variables to the
Current Population Survey sample. The AMT sample here is
also comparable to the AMT sample in Levy et al. (2015).
RESULTS
First, I report the results of the primary experiment. Table 1
captures type I audience costs by comparing public approval
for the president in the stay-out (control) and the reneged-
threat (treatment 1) conditions. The approval for the presi-
dent who reneged was 11 percentage points lower than that
for the president who stayed out. More precisely, the approval
rating (seven-point scale from 0 to 6) was lower at 2.38 in
treatment 1 compared to 3.02 in the control group (p ! :01).12
The results afﬁrm the signiﬁcance of type I audience costs.Table 1. Type I Audience Costs (%)Reaction to Reneged Threat
(1)Reaction to Staying Out
(2)11. Similar to Levy et al. (2015),
pressed in these treatments to avoid c
ence costs, as respondent support ma
tleﬁeld success and the different levels
12. All tests are two-tailed t-tes
tween approval and backing down
without sociodemographic controls.
throughout (table S2 in app. 2).
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(1 2 2)Approve 24.3 34.9 210.6
(17.9 to 30.7) (27.8 to 41.9) (220.1 to 21.1)Disapprove 47.4 36.0 11.4
(40.0 to 54.8) (28.9 to 43.1) (1.1 to 21.7)Note. Percentages of respondents who approved or disapproved of the president; 95% conﬁdence intervals are in parentheses.postintervention outcomes were sup-
onfounding the measurement of audi-
y be inﬂuenced by perceptions of bat-
of casualties incurred on both sides.
ts. I also analyze the relationship be-
with ordered logit models with and
The conclusion remains unchanged
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outcomes between treatment 2 (president intervened after
committing to intervene) and treatment 3 (president inter-
vened after committing not to intervene). Table 2 shows that
the approval for the president who reneged was 18 per-
centage points less than that for the president who did not
renege.13 More precisely, the approval rating was 2.71 for the
president who reneged. This is signiﬁcantly lower than the
3.38 received by the president who did not renege (p ! :01).14
These results show that type II audience costs are sub-
stantial. The ﬁndings also speak to the debate over the ex-
istence of a public preference for consistency. It turns out
that leaders are punished by the public for their inconsis-
tency whether they choose a policy of intervention (table 2)
or the opposite policy of nonintervention (table 1). This sug-
gests that policy consistency is important in the public mind
(cf. Snyder and Borghard 2011).15 The results also speak to
Levy et al.’s (2015) experiment, whichwas ﬁelded on a sample
from AMT in 2014.16 Their experiment found that leaders
suffer more for “backing out” than “backing in,” showing the
public has a stronger distaste for backing down compared to
breaking a peaceful promise, and thus there is greater incen-
tive not to retreat in a crisis.
The experiments here challenge this conclusion. Speciﬁ-
cally, Levy et al. (2015, 995) reported a decline in presidential
approval by 22 percentage points for backing out compared13. This is measured by the question: “Do you approve, disapprove, or
neither approve nor disapprove of the way the U.S. president handled the
situation?” (app. 1). Appendix 2 shows consistent results when we include
“leaners” (tables S3 and S4). “Leaners” chose “neither approve nor disapprove”
but said they lean toward approving/disapproving when probed further.
14. Table S5 in app. 2 corroborates the result using ordered logit
models with sociodemographic controls.
15. The results show that policy consistency matters to the public in a
foreign-intervention scenario. They do not imply that consistency is al-
ways more important than substance.
16. Levy et al.’s experiment used a similar vignette as the one here and
in Tomz (2007) but with a few deviations (see Levy et al. 2015, 992–94).
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approval declined by 11% for backing out—close to Tomz’s
(2007, 827) ﬁnding of 12%—compared to 18% for backing
in (also close to the replication study’s 19%; see table 3).
The difference in conclusions is due to (i) the higher ap-
proval rates found in Levy et al.’s experiment (41%) when
respondents learned that the president promised not to use
force but reneged and used force, compared to both the SSI
experiment (30%) and my later replication on AMT (also
30%), and (ii) the higher type I audience costs found in Levy
et al.’s AMT experiment (22% fall in approval), compared to
11% in my SSI experiment and 12% in Tomz’s (2007) ex-
periment. Contrary to Levy et al. (2015), my results suggest
that we should not downplay the costs of breaking peaceful
promises, or overplay the costs of backing down and the
political incentives for escalating a crisis.Replication tests
Two further tests are conducted using a separate national
sample from AMT in June 2013 (np 778). The ﬁrst test
replicated the SSI primary experiment: subjects were told in
condition 1 that the president had said the US military would
push out the invaders if the attack continued; subjects ran-
domly assigned to condition 2 were told that the president
had said the United States would stay out of the conﬂict. In
both conditions, the attacking country continued to invade,
and the scenario ended with the president sending troops.
The approval rating was 2.57 for the president who reneged
on the promise to stay out, which was lower than the 3.47
received by the president who did not renege (p ! :001). The
results are close to those in the primary experiment using the
SSI sample (2.71 for the president who reneged and 3.38 for
the president who did not). Table 3 shows the president whoTable 2. Type II Audience Costs: Primary Experiment (%)Reaction to Reneged Commitment
(1)Reaction to Fulﬁlled Commitment
(2)17. The comparison is based on
reported results. In addition, tables 1–
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than that received by the president who did not renege. Again,
these results are consistent with the primary experiment, as
shown by comparing tables 2 and 3.18
I have measured type II audience costs by comparing
public approval between condition 1 (president intervened
after committing to intervene) and condition 2 (president
intervened after committing not to intervene). Type II au-
dience costs may also be measured by the difference in ap-
proval between condition 2 and an alternative baseline—
condition 3—when the president did not intervene after
committing not to intervene. Hence, I included in the same
experiment a second replication test based on condition 3.
The approval rating in condition 2 (2.57) was lower than in
condition 3 (3.85, p ! :001). Overall approval for the pres-
ident who reneged (30%) collapsed by 22 percentage points
compared to the president who did not. These results conﬁrm
that type II audience costs are signiﬁcant and large, whichever
way we measure them.
Decomposing type II audience costs
Using conditions 1–3 we can decompose type II audience
costs into an inconsistency cost and the loss of the nonbel-
ligerence dividend. Speciﬁcally, the loss of the nonbelligerence
dividend (0.38 points on the seven-point approval scale) is
measured based on the difference in approval when the pre-
sident promises to stay out and follows through (condition 3)
versus promises to intervene and follows through (condi-
tion 1). The inconsistency cost (1.28 points) ismeasured based
on the difference in approval when the president promises to
stay out and follows through (condition 3) versus promises to
stay out and reneges (condition 2). Both differences are sta-
tistically signiﬁcant (p ! :05). Together, the inconsistency18. Ordered logit analysis conﬁrms a negative and signiﬁcant rela-
tionship (p ! :001) between public approval and a reneged commitment to
stay out. Table S5 (app. 2) displays the ordered logit estimates side by side
with those from the SSI experiment.
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1.66 points on the seven-point scale.19
This decomposition of type II audience costs parallels
the decomposition of type I audience costs (1.35 points) in
Kertzer and Brutger (2016, 242). In the decomposition of
type II audience costs, the loss of the nonbelligerence dividend
(0.38 points) is comparable to the belligerence cost (0.45 points)
in Kertzer and Brutger, but the inconsistency cost is larger
for type II audience costs (1.28 points) than for type I audi-
ence costs (0.91 points). This comparison further cautions us
against downplaying the costs of breaking peaceful promises
and the political incentives of leaders to stay out of war.
CONCLUSION
This article deﬁnes type II audience costs, develops the idea,
measures the phenomenon, and decomposes the concept into
its constituents. The idea behind type II audience costs is
simple but has remained largely unrecognized. It motivates a
new way of thinking about audience costs. It extends beyond
the type I audience costs traditionally conceived in the liter-
ature and deepens our understanding of the microfounda-
tions of audience cost theory. Type II audience costs can help
to credibly signal a state’s resolve not to ﬁght. To the extent
that type II audience costs can be generated by leaders and en-
forced by publics, leaders will have to think twice before en-
tering a conﬂict they said they would not, and peaceful re-
assurances can gain credibility in a way that cheap talk cannot.
Open questions abound. First, what are the determinants
of type II audience costs? Given the differences between type I
and type II audience costs, it is unknown whether the same
factors that move type I audience costs will lead to similar,
opposite, or null effects for type II audience costs. Future re-Table 3. Type II Audience Costs: Replication Experiment (%)Reaction to Reneged Commitment
(1)Reaction to Fulﬁlled Commitment
(2)19. Breaking the data down by su
is signiﬁcant in each demographic (ex
The belligerence effect is generally sm
and conservatives) and operates sig
earners, and non-Republicans/conse
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(24.8 to 36.0) (43.7 to 55.9) (227.7 to 211.2)Disapprove 45.4 30.9 14.5
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moved by these variables in the same way that traditional
audience costs are. Second, do the dynamics of type II audi-
ence costs vary across different regime types? In terms of re-
assurance, a regime with a stronger domestic audience should
have a stronger ability to signal its cooperative intent via
type II audience costs.20 The greater the type II audience costs
generated by the leader, the more likely it is for the leader not
to renege. If democratic regimes are indeed more capable of
generating type II audience costs, then one may expect to ob-
serve higher levels of cooperation and reassurance success
among democracies than among nondemocracies, lending
support to a “democratic reassurance thesis.”
Third, are statements of resolve infused with audience costs
at the signaler’s end accurately and credibly perceived at the
receiver’s end (Quek 2016; Yarhi-Milo, Kertzer, and Renshon
2016)? This question is important to answer because the logic
of audience costs may be undercut by the existence of a
sender-receiver gap (Quek 2016). Fourth, how do type II au-
dience costs operate across different countries or issue do-
mains? This question is hard to answer unless we can compare
the results from different studies conducted across different
contexts. To this end, this article hopes to form a foundation
for future research to better understand where, and in what
ways, the phenomenon of type II audience costs applies.20. Type II audience costs have two deﬁning properties that differ-
entiate the idea from sunk cost reassurance (Kydd 2005) and that make it
an attractive signaling mechanism for reassurance purposes. Type II au-
dience costs are based on tying hands. They are contingent costs. Whether
they are incurred depends on whether the promise is reneged. Unlike the
sunk cost signaler who incurs a cost regardless of whether the promise is
kept, our signaler here does not incur a cost unless the promise is broken.
At the same time, type II audience costs are ex post costs. Thus, our signaler
does not face the same resource constraint that the sunk cost signaler faces.
The sunk cost signaler must be willing and able to pay the cost at the point
of signaling, but our signaler here does not. It is the unwillingness and in-
ability to suffer type II audience costs ex post that make them ex ante com-
pelling as a reassurance device.
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